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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to predict the damage that could be created on a reinforced 
concrete wall due to the impact of Tri-Nitro Toluene (TNT) shaped charge using a numerical 
simulation software. There are many commercial numerical simulation software that can be used 
to solve engineering problems in real world scenarios, such as ANSYS, ABAQUS, LS-DYNA, 
etc. ANSYS Simulation Software is one of the strongest and user-friendly commercial finite 
element analysis (FEA) tools that uses computer-based numerical techniques.  
In this study, two different types of simulation software codes which can be coupled for 
the advanced analysis are used within ANSYS Simulation Software system. One is ANSYS 
Explicit Dynamic STR (Structure) software and the other one is ANSYS AUTODYN software. 
ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR software provides suitable solutions of nonlinear dynamic events 
for a short duration, including a drop and impact testing with low velocity or high velocity, 
deformation by high pressure, explosion, etc. ANSYS AUTODYN software also provides 
suitable solutions of nonlinear dynamic events similar to ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR, but 
this software is focused on complicated nonlinear dynamic events like high explosions and 
detailed damage responses of materials such as cracks and fragments.  
The reinforced concrete wall target is located at a distance of 50 meters from a TNT 
shaped charge design. Various TNT shaped charge designs are studied by changing the amount 
of TNT and liner fragment thickness, etc. in order to make the hole-size big enough on the 
concrete wall target so that at least a person can pass through it at a time. 
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In addition, a physical protection system vulnerability assessment is performed with a 
hypothetic nuclear research reactor assuming that TNT shaped charge is used in order to reach to 
a desired target from the offsite to the nuclear research reactor. The probability of interruption (PI) 
is calculated with the Adversary Sequence Diagram (ASD) using Estimate of Adversary 
Sequence Interruption (EASI) model to conduct the vulnerability assessment, which provides the 
most vulnerable paths to reach to the target while minimizing time delay (tD) and the probability 
of detection (PD).  
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
SNM Special Nuclear Material 
TNT Tri-Nitro Toluene 
FEA Finite Element Analysis 
STR Structure 
ASD Adversary Sequence Diagram 
EASI Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption 
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HE High Explosive 
LD Liner Distance 
WD Warhead Diameter 
OD Outer Distance 
RHT Riedel-Hiermaier-Thoma 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Nuclear power plants are critical facilities that need to be protected, because attack or 
sabotage on a nuclear power plant can cause significant harmful effects on humans including the 
release of high levels of radioactivity as an example. There are well-known examples, which 
show hazardous effects on humans, of a nuclear accident in Chernobyl, Ukraine and Fukushima 
Daiichi, Japan. In addition, it could also be an avenue for adversaries to steal special nuclear 
material (SNM) such as uranium or plutonium to make nuclear explosive devices after attack or 
sabotage on a nuclear power plant. Therefore, it is important to predict the blast load or its 
impact correctly on the structures that can be used in a nuclear power plant, because terrorists 
can attack a nuclear power plant using direct explosions by TNT (Tri Nitro Toluene) or other 
explosive materials, bullets, or linear shaped charges.  
In this study, a terrorist is supposed to design a shaped charge using TNT explosive 
material, and the terrorist tries to make a hole and passes into one of nuclear reactor facilities so 
that the terrorist can sabotage the facility further or SNM that are used to make nuclear weapon 
devices. A target is considered as the high strength reinforced concrete wall that is used for the 
nuclear facility building construction, and the terrorist shoots the TNT shaped charge to make a 
hole on the target from a distance of 50 meters. 
A shaped charge is often made as a cylinder filled with an explosive material, a detonator 
at one end and a hollow cavity with a metallic conical liner at the other. Upon detonation of the 
explosive, the conical liner collapses into a metallic jet with a very high speed excess of several 
thousand meters per second. The last part of the jet has lower velocity. The jet may penetrate to 
large depths which is several times of the charge diameter (CD). The penetration is often given 
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in the charge diameters. The penetration of a shaped charge increases with the jet length and 
density and decreases with higher target density.1 A drawing of a shaped charge is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. General 2D Drawing of Shaped Charge Design. 
 
 
 
Where, the HE represents the high explosive material, the LD represents the liner distance, and 
the WD or OD represents the warhead diameter or the outer distance. 
The shaped charge concept has been used and developed widely in various applications 
of military and civilian purpose. The main purpose of a shaped charge is to make a hole in a 
material that is otherwise difficult to penetrate through. Originally, shaped charges were first 
developed after World War I to penetrate tanks and other armored equipment.3 However, further 
researches of the shaped charges in earnest were started after World War II for the military 
purpose. This is because shaped charges can efficiently damage tanks processing thick amour 
protection, bunkers and aircraft and are useful for attacking ships and submarines.4 Although the 
research of the shaped charges have started to be developed for the military purpose, there are 
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various civilian applications which finds use in the peaceful purpose. Mining, a deep penetration 
tunnel into the rock formation and oil well perforations are examples in civilian application.5  
To conduct this study, ANSYS Simulation Software is used to predict the impact damage 
and the penetration of a reinforced concrete wall target by a TNT shaped charge. ANSYS 
simulation software is one of the strongest commercialized simulation software to solve 
engineering problems or multi-physics’ events such as electronics, fluids, impact and drop 
testing, and high explosion analysis etc. Two different types of simulation software are coupled 
for further advanced analysis within ANSYS Simulation Software. One is ANSYS Explicit 
Dynamic STR (Structure) software and the other one is ANSYS AUTODYN software. ANSYS 
Explicit Dynamic STR code provides suitable solutions of nonlinear dynamic events for a short 
duration, including a drop and impact testing with low velocity or high velocity, deformation by 
high pressure, explosion, and failure analysis etc. ANSYS AUTODYN code also provides 
suitable solutions of nonlinear dynamic events similar to ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code, 
but this software is focused on complicated nonlinear dynamic events like high explosions and 
detailed damage responses of materials such as crack and fragment.  
There are difficulties in this study to validate numerical results with existing experimental 
data unless an experiment is performed for such evaluations. Therefore, several benchmark 
simulations, which compare numerical results to the experimental data related to this study, are 
studied and conducted before the simulations of this study are performed so that numerical 
results of this study can be reasonable to the real scenarios. There are three major steps, with 
assumptions, to conduct the numerical simulation. The first step is to simulate shaped charges 
using ANSYS AUTODYN code to find the jet velocity of the liner fragment and to estimate the 
size of the liner fragment created by the shaped charge design. From the data collected in 
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ANSYS AUTODYN code, the next step is to model a reinforced concrete wall and model the 
fragment by applying for necessary initial conditions and boundary conditions such as Fixed 
Support at all outer surface of the reinforced concrete wall model, Standard Earth Gravity for 
both of the reinforced concrete wall model and the fragment, and the velocity of the fragment to 
analyze the given problem using ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR. The last step is to transfer the 
data modeled from ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code to ANSYS AUTODYN code to check 
the approximate hole size created by the shaped charge design. 
1.2 Previous Work 
Previous work on the simulation of various shaped charge designs, or various simulations 
of the jet penetration impact into steel based armor, plane concrete, or reinforced concrete has 
been a topic of discussion for decades. In 2009, Werner Riedel wrote a chapter titled, “10 Years 
RHT: A Review of Concrete Modeling and Hydrocode Applications” with the name of book 
titled “Predictive Modeling of Dynamic Process, pp 143-165”.8 The paper discusses the RHT 
(Riedel-Hiermaier-Thoma) concrete model that has proven in a number of worldwide 
applications to successfully link low dynamic strength details to shock physics and to be 
applicable across the dynamic range of numerical simulations.8 The paper also discusses many 
dynamic load cases such as projectile and shaped charge penetration, contact detonation, internal 
and external blast loading that have been proven and validated through numerical codes for 
several decades, however the paper emphasizes that high training in numerical dynamic load 
field is significant to provide real life solutions efficiently.8  
 In 2014, Kamal Guendouz et al. published a paper titled, “Autodyn 2D Simulation of 
Shaped Charge Jet Formation and Penetration Mechanism into Multi-Layered Shielded Target”.9 
The paper discusses the shaped charge jet formation depends on different parameters which has 
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effect on jet behavior such as jet velocity, breakup and penetration. Jet radius or liner thickness, 
shell thickness, liner material density, α angle and stand-off distance are evaluated for the 
purpose of investigating the effect on performance of shaped charge jet velocity and jet breakup 
phenomena. The paper discusses the effect of stand-off distance on shaped charge jet penetration 
into steel target.9 The paper also discusses the efficiency of resulted numerical solutions by 
comparing with the experiments done and reported in literature and Brikhoff’s theory which 
states any spherically symmetric solution of vacuum field equations must be static and 
asymptotically flat.9,10  
In addition, in 2014, KRÁLIK Juraj published a paper titled, “Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants against the Aircraft Attack”.11 The paper discusses the nonlinear dynamic analysis of the 
reinforced concrete building of nuclear power plant to the aircraft impact, and the paper 
discusses the calculation of dynamic response and damage evaluation of the reinforced concrete 
wall or place using the transient nonlinear analysis solution method in ANSYS.11 
In 2017, Ezzedin Gauluta et al. published a paper titled, “Numerical Simulation of RC 
Panels Subjected to High Speed Projectile – Erosion Selection in AUTODYN-3D code”.8 The 
paper discusses the erosion effect on the numerical simulation of reinforced concrete (RC) panels 
subjected to the impact of high speed projectile (0.50 cal. Bullet). Also, the paper discusses the 
response of the bullet residual velocity and damage depth at front and rear faces of the concrete 
panel from variations of erosion strain values and mesh size of the concrete panel.12 
1.3 Goals of Thesis 
This project will be completed as follows: 
1. Conduct literature search and benchmark simulations of shaped charge impact on 
concrete or steel. 
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2. Model a reinforced concrete wall and a high jet velocity fragment. 
3. Conduct linear impact and penetration analysis on the reinforced concrete wall. 
4. Conduct parametric studies to make a big enough size of the hole on the reinforce 
concrete wall for a person to pass through at a time. 
5. Predict a big enough size of the hole created by a TNT shaped charge design so that a 
person can pass through the hole at a time. 
6. Perform probability of interruption of adversary attack calculation by considering the 
vulnerability of physical protection system (PPS) at a nuclear facility if a shaped 
charge is used. 
1.4 Significance 
The goal of this thesis is to predict a big enough hole-size on a reinforced concrete wall 
by a TNT shaped charge design using a numerical simulation software under a scenario that a 
terrorist attacks or sabotages one of the nuclear facilities. Potentially, nuclear power plants can 
cause very harmful effects on humans including the release of high radioactivity if there are any 
accidents or a terrorist attacks. Shaped charges have started to be developed in the military 
purpose, also the shaped charges can be used in various applications for both military and 
civilian purpose. Thus, shaped charges can be one of the possible threats to be considered from a 
terrorist. However, the possible threats to the nuclear power plants, like destroying nuclear power 
plant facilities further, or stealing SNM that can be used to make a nuclear weapon device after 
the terrorist passes through the hole created, can be predicted and prevented in nuclear security 
area. In addition, this study can aim to provide better suggestions while contributing to the 
missions of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security. 
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2. NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
 
2.1 Material Properties, Formulas, and Solvers 
All material properties and EOS (Equation of State) were obtained from ANSYS 
AUTODYN Materials Library. Air, TNT, AL 2024-T4, Copper, Concrete 140 MPa, and Steel 
4340 were used for the numerical modeling and simulation. Other settings or parameters that are 
not mentioned here were set with default values or none by ANSYS AUTODYN code. In solvers, 
Lagrange processor was applied for modeling solid continua and structures, and Euler processor 
was applied with multi-material flow for modeling fluids, gases, and large distortion.13 Also, 
Erosion and Failure were applied to see a distortion phenomenon in Lagrange models. The 
materials of Air, TNT, AL 2024, Copper were used in modeling and simulating in Euler 
processor, and the materials of Copper, Concrete 140 MPa, and Steel 4340 were used in 
modeling and simulating in Lagrange processor. 
Air has EOS of Ideal Gas with its material properties shown in Eq. 1 and Table 1 
respectively.13  
p = (γ − 1)ρe + Pshift              (1) 
Where, γ is the adiabatic exponent, ρ is the density of air, e is internal air energy, and Pshift is a 
small initial pressure defined to give a zero starting pressure. 
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Table 1. Material Properties of Air. 
Air 
Reference density (g/cm3) 1.225e-3 
EOS Ideal gas 
Gamma 1.400 
Adiabatic constant 0.000 
Pressure shift 0.000 
Reference temperature (K) 288.200012  
Specific heat (J/kg K) 717.599976  
 
 
 
TNT has EOS of JWL (Jones, Wilkins and Lee) shown in Eq 2 which describes the 
detonation product expansion down to a pressure of 1 kbar for high energy materials and has 
been proposed by Jones, Wilkins and Lee13. Its material properties are shown in Table 2. 
P = A (1 −
𝑤
R1V
) e−R1V + B (1 −
𝑤
R2V
) e−R2V +
𝑊E
V
        (2) 
Where, the values of the constants A, B, R1, R, w for many common explosives have been 
determined from dynamic experiments and are available in ANSYS AUTODYN material library. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Material Properties of TNT. 
TNT 
Reference density (g/cm3) 1.630 
EOS JWL 
Parameter A (kPa) 3.737700e+8  
Parameter B (kPa) 3.747100e+6  
Parameter R1 4.150 
Parameter R2 0.900 
Parameter w 0.350 
C-J Detonation velocity (m/s) 6.930e+3  
C-J Energy / unit volume (kJ/m3) 6.000e+6  
C-J Pressure (kPa) 2.100e+7  
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AL 2004-T4 and Copper has EOS of Shock, and its material properties are shown in 
Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 respectively.13  
 
 
 
Table 3. Material Properties of AL 2024-T4. 
AL 2024-T4 
Reference density (g/cm3) 8.900 
EOS Shock 
Gruneisen coefficient  2.000 
Parameter C1 (m/s) 5.328e+3 
Parameter S1 1.338 
Reference temperature (K) 300  
Specific heat (J/kgK) 863.000061  
Strength Steinberg Guinan 
Shear modulus (kPa) 2.860e+7  
Yield stress (kPa) 2.600e+5  
Maximum yield stress (kPa) 7.600e+5  
Hardening constant 310.000 
Hardening exponent 0.185 
Melting temperature (K) 1.220e+3  
Failure None 
Erosion None 
 
 
 
Table 4. Material Properties of Copper in Euler Processor. 
Copper 
Reference density (g/cm3) 8.900 
EOS Shock 
Gruneisen coefficient  2.000 
Parameter C1 (m/s) 3.940e+3  
Parameter S1 1.489 
Strength None 
Failure None 
Erosion None 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
Table 5. Material Properties of Copper in Lagrange Processor. 
Copper 
Reference density (g/cm3) 8.900 
EOS Shock 
Gruneisen coefficient  2.000 
Parameter C1 (m/s) 3.940e+3  
Parameter S1 1.489 
Reference temperature (K) 295.149994 
Specific heat (J/kgK) 0.386 
Strength Multilinear hardening 
Shear modulus (kPa) 4.640e+7  
Hardening Isotropic 
Failure None 
Erosion Geometric strain 
Erosion strain 0.0022 
Type of geometric strain Instantaneous 
 
 
 
140 MPa Concrete has EOS of Alpha Porosity Plastic shown in Eq 3, also 140 MPa 
Concrete has RHA (Riedel-Hiermaier-Thoma) model shown in Eq 4.13  
α = 1 + (αp − 1) (
Ps−P
Ps−Pe
)
n
                (3) 
Where, Ps is the solid compaction pressure at full compaction, Pe is the initial compaction 
pressure at αp, and e is the compaction exponent. 
YTXC = 𝑓′𝑐 [AFAIL(P
∗Pspall
∗ FRATE)
NFAIL
]           (4) 
Where, 𝑌𝑇𝑋𝐶 is the fracture surface, 𝑓𝑐
′ is the cylindrical strength, AFAIL, NFAIL are user defined 
parameters, P* is pressure normalized with respect to  𝑓𝑐
′, Pspall
∗  is the normalized hydrodynamic 
tensile limit, FRate is a rate dependent enhancement factor shown Eq 5, and its material 
properties are shown in Table 6.13 
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FRate = {
    1 + (
ε̇
ε0̇
)
α
for P > 1/3𝑓𝑐  with ε0̇ = 30 x 10
−6 s−1 (compression)
1 + (
ε̇
ε0̇
)
δ
for P < 1/3𝑓𝑐  with with ε0̇ = 3 x 10
−6 s−1(tension)
  (5) 
Where, α is the compressive strain rate exponent and δ is the tensile strain rate exponent. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Material Properties of 140 MPa Concrete. 
140 MPa Concrete 
Reference density (g/cm3) 2.750 
EOS P alpha 
Bulk Modulus A1 (kPa)  3.527e+7 
Strength RHT Concrete 
Shear Modulus (kPa) 2.206e+7 
Compressive Strength, fc (kPa) 1.400e+7 
Failure RHT Concrete 
Damage Constant, D1 0.040 
Damage Constant, D2 1.000 
Tensile Failure Hydro (Pmin) 
Erosion Geometric strain 
Erosion strain 0.500 
Type of geometric strain Instantaneous 
 
 
 
Steel 4340 has Johnson and Cook model which represents the strength behavior of 
materials, typically metals, subjected to large strains, high strain rates and high temperatures 
shown in Eq 4.13 
σy = (A + Bεp
n)(1 + Clnεṗ)(1 − TH
m)            (6) 
Where, εp is the effective plastic strain, εṗ is the normalized effective plastic strain, TH is the 
homogeneous temperature, and the material constants are A, B, C, n, and m. TH is depended on 
the room temperature Troom and meeting temperature Tmelting, and given by Eq 5, and Its material 
properties are shown in Table 7.13 
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TH =
T−Troom
Tmelt−Troom
                 (7) 
The Constants A, B C, n, m where A is the initial yield stress, B is the hardening constant, n is 
the hardening exponent, C is the strain rate constant, and m is the thermal softening exponent. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Material Properties of Steel 4340. 
Steel 4340 
Reference density (g/cm3) 7.83 
EOS Linear 
Bulk modulus (kPa) 1.590e+8 
Reference temperature (K) 295.149994 
Specific heat (J/kgK) 477 
Strength Johnson Cook 
Shear modulus (kPa) 8.18e+7 
Yield stress (kPa) 7.92e+5  
Hardening constant (kPa)  5.10e+5 
Hardening exponent  0.26 
Strain rate constant 0.014 
Thermal softening exponent 1.03 
Melting temperature (K) 1.793e+3 
Ref. strain rate (s-1) 1.000 
Failure Principal strain 
Principal tensile failure strain 0.002 
Erosion Geometric strain 
Erosion strain 2.0000 
Type of geometric strain Instantaneous 
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2.2 Study of Simulation Codes and Benchmark Simulations  
Before the numerical simulations of this study were performed, several benchmark 
studies were conducted using literature search, ANSYS tutorials, and published papers. First, the 
published paper titled “Autodyn 2D Simulation of Shaped Charge Jet Formation and Penetration 
Mechanism into Multi-Layered Shielded Target” by Kamal Guendouz et al. in 2014 was referred 
as the benchmark study for modeling and simulating TNT shaped charge.9  
By Kamel Guendouz et al., a shaped charge was modeled using materials of AL 2024-T4 
for the cylindrical case, TNT for the explosive material, and Copper for the metallic conical liner 
using ANSYS AUTODYN code. Then, the shaped charge modeled was simulated to investigate 
how deep into a steel target the shaped charge can penetrate within a steel target, which consists 
of Steel V250 material at different charge distances. 
The benchmark simulation was performed to compare simulation results between the 
reference paper and the benchmark simulation. Before the simulation was performed in ANSYS 
AUTODYN code, 2D drawing was performed using AutoCAD (Computer-Aided Design) 
software to help visualize the model shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 2D Drawing for Benchmark Simulation (Dimensions are in mm). 
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Also, it could be used to calculate the mass of the explosive by the geometry of the volume of the 
cylinder (TNT) and cone (copper liner) with the known its materials’ density, and the calculated 
TNT mass was 1.05 kg for the shaped charge modeled by the reference paper. 
Here, the benchmark simulation shows only as an example that the steel target was 
located at a distance of 324 mm (4 CD) from the shaped charge. ANSYS AUTODYN input (left) 
and output (right) code for the benchmark simulation is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
     
Figure 3. ANSYS AUTODYN Input and Output Code for Benchmark Simulation. 
 
 
 
From the input and output code for the benchmark simulation, it resulted about 257 mm of the 
penetration depth in the steel target, and the result of the reference paper resulted 258.50 mm. 
Both of the results were not matched perfectly, because there were not available the full details 
of the simulation input data from the reference paper, however they agree reasonably well. 
Possible reasons of the difference could be the precision of the grid to measure the depth of 
penetration, solvers, or material data inputs of the steel target. 
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Second, the reinforced concrete was modeled through the literature search and ANSYS 
tutorials. Before beginning the study of numerical modeling, a reinforced concrete was drawn 
using AutoCAD software with dimensions of 1000 mm (L) x 200 mm (H) x 110 mm (W). This 
step was to aim the visibility for the modeling. The concrete wall was reinforced with 5 mm ø 
steel bars with spacing 50 mm in vertical direction. There was a space of 5 mm at the outermost 
steel bars. Also, there was a space of 27 mm at the outermost bottom steel bar. 2D drawing of the 
reinforced concrete and 2D drawing of details of the reinforced steel bars are shown in Figure 4 
and Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Study of Reinforced Concrete with Steel Bars in 2D Drawing (Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Study of Reinforced Concrete of Steel Bars in 2D Drawing (Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
Afterwards, the reinforced concrete was modeled using ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR 
code. In the code, the mesh size of 15 mm was applied to the 35 MPa concrete and the structure 
steel. Also, the conditions of the connection between the concrete and the steel bars were applied 
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as Frictionless and Reinforcement. The concrete with the reinforced steel bars in it and the 
reinforced steel bars without the concrete are shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
        
Figure 6. Study of Reinforced Concrete with Steel Bars in 3D Model.  
 
 
 
Third, the published journal paper titled “Numerical Simulation of RC Panels Subjected 
to High Speed Projectile – Erosion Selection in AUTODYN-3D code” by Ezzedin Gauluta et al. 
in 2017 was referred as the benchmark study for the modeling and simulating the impact 
investigation on the reinforced concrete model due to the TNT shaped charge in general.12  
Lastly, the published paper titled “Experimental and numerical study on the flight and 
penetration properties of explosively-formed projectile”  by Wu J, Liu J, Du Y was referred to 
assume the shape of the fragment (projectile) produced due to TNT shaped charge.21 The paper 
performed an actual experiment of TNT shaped charge on a steel target in order to compare 
experimental results and numerical results. Also, the paper investigated the shape of the 
explosively-formed projectile due to TNT shaped charge. In the paper, the shape of the projectile 
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was not a perfectly bullet shape, however it could be looked like a bullet shape reasonably. Thus, 
this paper assumed the shape of the fragment to be a bullet shape. 
There were various methods to model a reinforced concrete model, and there were not 
enough details to know how the reference papers modeled a reinforced concrete. Also, the most 
of shaped charge simulations were done with a steel target by literature searching. Therefore, the 
benchmark simulation with a reinforced concrete target could not be performed, however 
material data inputs for the reinforced concrete could be referred from the paper12 and idea of 
what configuration should be in a target materials by high velocity projectile such as bullets and 
shaped charges from the papers.12,21 
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2.3 Numerical Simulation Method and Results 
The numerical simulation of this study was performed using a high speed computer 
processor Intel Xeon E3-1505M v6 quad-core 3GHz, Nividia Quadro P5000, Intel HD Graphics 
P630, and RAM 64GB DDR4 ECC. Also, ANSYS 18.0 Academic version was used in order to 
perform the numerical simulation.  
In this study, there were three major steps. The first step was to model a reinforced 
concrete wall in ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code. The second step was to model and 
simulate a TNT shaped charge in ANSYS AUTODYN code. The last step was to perform the 
impact investigation on the reinforced concrete model due to TNT shaped charge in ANSYS 
AUTODYN code. In the last step, there were two sub-steps. The first sub-step was to model the 
fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge with the reinforced concrete model in ANSYS 
Explicit Dynamic STR code. The second sub-step was to transfer all modeled data from ANSYS 
Explicit Dynamic STR code to ANSYS AUTODYN code to perform the impact investigation 
simulation on the reinforced concrete model due to the TNT shaped charge in the last step. 
Firstly, before beginning numerical modeling, a reinforced concrete wall as the target was 
drawn using AutoCAD (Computer-Aided Design) software with dimensions of 1850 mm (L) x 
1807 mm (H) x 300 mm (W). This step was to aim the visibility for the modeling. The concrete 
wall was reinforced with 14 mm ø steel bars with spacing 100 mm in vertical direction and 160 
mm in horizontal direction. There was a space of 20 mm at the outermost upper steel bar and the 
outermost right and left steel bars. Also, there was a space of 27 mm at the outermost bottom 
steel bar. 2D drawing of the reinforced concrete and 2D drawing of details of the reinforced steel 
are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. 2D Drawing of Reinforced Concrete Wall (Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 2D Drawing of Reinforced Concrete Wall of Steel Bars (Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
Afterwards, the reinforced concrete was modeled using ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR 
code. In the code, the mesh size of 22 mm was applied to the 140 MPa concrete and the steel 
4030. Also, the conditions of the connection between the concrete and the steel bars were applied 
as Frictionless and Reinforcement. The concrete with the reinforced steel bars in it is shown in 
Figure 9, and the reinforced steel bars without the concrete are shown in Figure 10.  
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Figure 9. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Steel Bars in 3D Model. 
 
 
 
   
Figure 10. 3D Model of Steel Bars at Front and Side Views. 
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The reinforced concrete was modeled with materials of 140 MPa which had density of 
2.75 g/cm3 and 4030 steel which had density of 7.83 g/cm3 obtained from ANSYS AUTODYN 
material library. The reinforced concreted model was considered with very high strength level of 
the concrete and the concrete was highly reinforced with steel bars. Therefore, to be more 
realistic, the strength level of the concrete considered were in the range of 20.68 - 48.26 MPa 
(3,000 - 7,000 psi) which could be typically used for reinforced concrete beams, slabs, columns 
and walls.24 
Second, the numerical modeling and simulating of the TNT shaped charges were 
performed in ANSYS AUTODYN code. Before beginning, a design of shaped charge was drawn 
in 2D using AutoCAD software shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. 2D Drawing of TNT Shaped Charge as Beginning Design  
(Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
This step was performed, because the TNT shaped charges were modeled and simulated 
as 2D in ANSYS AUTODYN code, thus it helps to visualize the model. Also, this step was 
aimed to calculate the amount of TNT in designed models. The amount of TNT was calculated 
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by the geometry of the volume of the cylinder (TNT) and cone (copper liner) with the known 
materials’ density. The first design of the TNT shaped charge model was calculated with the 
amount of 7.64 kg TNT. 
Then, the TNT shaped charge was modeled and simulated in ANSYS AUTODYN code 
shown in Figure 12. Dense blue represents air, red represents TNT, light green represents 
aluminum 2024-T4 which is the outer cylindrical case for TNT, and light blue represents copper 
which is the conical shaped of the liner. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Numerical Modeling and Simulation of 7.64 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
In the numerical simulation, the mesh size of the shaped charge study was 1 mm, and the initial 
condition of Air that was the internal energy was applied as 2.068e+5 J/kg at 288 K.19 Also, the 
flow-out boundary condition as the equilibrium state on all materials used was applied to the air, 
then the simulation was executed. The numerical model of the TNT shaped charge was designed 
and simulated in 2D, however the model could be represented in 3D by rotating x-axis of 360o.  
The shape of the fragment produced due to the explosion of the TNT shaped charge was 
assumed similar to the bullet shape referring from the published paper.10 Using the Axes in the 
Plot section of the View tap, the size was estimated measuring from the front tip to the end tip 
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for the length of the fragment and the diameter at the end tip for the diameter of the fragment 
shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Fragment Measurement Point. 
 
 
 
The data of the incident velocity where the fragment was turned right to be the bullet 
shape fully was resulted in the output. The velocity output was 2039.9 m/s, and the size of the 
fragment was measured 159 mm length from the front tip to the end tip and 38 mm diameter at 
the end of the tip. 
Third, the fragment was modeled combining with the modeled reinforced concrete in 
ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 14. In this modeling, the mesh size for the 
fragment was 22 mm which was same as the reinforced concrete modeling. Also, initial 
conditions and boundary conditions were applied to the model as Fixed Support at all outer 
surface of the reinforced concrete model, Standard Earth Gravity for both of the reinforced 
concrete model and the fragment, and the velocity of the fragment. For the velocity condition of 
the fragment, it was necessary to be applied as the initial conditions in the-negative-x direction, 
not as boundary conditions. This was because there is difference between the boundary condition 
and the initial condition. The initial condition is time dependence and the boundary condition is 
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space dependence. Also, the fragment was modeled at 2 -m away from the reinforced concrete 
model, and the modeled reinforced concrete and fragment is shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 7.64 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
Lastly, the data of the modeled reinforced concrete and fragment were transferred to 
ANSYS AUTODYN code from ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code in order to simulate the 
entire model together at a distance of 50 -m between the reinforced concrete and the fragment. 
When the modeled reinforced concrete and fragment were transferred to the ANSYS 
AUTODYN code, the location of the fragment was not centered. Thus, the fragment was located 
to be at centered and 50 -m away from the reinforced concrete model. The re-location step of the 
fragment was conducted by steps following Setup→ Components→ Translate in 
Transformations. The other settings remained with default values that were set up automatically 
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when the all designed models were transferred to ANSYS AUTODYN code. Then, all settings of 
this numerical simulation method was completed for the impact investigation on the reinforced 
concrete model due to the TNT shaped charge in ANSYS AUTODYN code shown in Figure 15. 
In the final settings of the TNT shaped charge model, initially the fragment was located at 2 -m 
away from the reinforced concrete, because the size of the fragment was not big enough to see at 
the location of 50 -m away from the reinforced concrete. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Final Simulation Settings of 7.64 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 After all settings were completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the simulation was 
executed. The fragment produced due to 7.64 kg TNT shaped charge took 27.20 ms with the 
incident velocity of 2039.9 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. 
The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on 
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the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the 
Axes, and the hole size was 86 mm at the front side and 103 mm at the back side, and the result 
of the simulation is shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Hole Created at Front Side due to 7.64kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Hole Created at Back Side due to 7.64kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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2.4 Parametric Studies and Results 
After the numerical simulation was completed, parametric studies of TNT shaped charges 
were conducted in order to investigate the creation of a big enough size of the hole on the 
reinforced concrete model so that a person can pass through. This was because the hole size of 
86 mm at the front side and 103 mm at the back side due to 7.64 kg TNT shaped charge were 
created on the reinforced concrete model, but this was not enough size for a person to pass 
through. Thus, for the parametric studies, the horizontal or vertical lengths, and the thickness of 
liners were increased using the first designed 7.64 kg TNT shaped charge. 
2.4.1 Parametric Study of Horizontal Length Increase   
First, the parametric study of increasing horizontal lengths of TNT shaped charge was 
conducted. There were three cases in this parametric study. The horizontal length for each case 
was increased twice from the first TNT shaped charge design. 2D drawings were completed to 
calculate amount of TNT and aim for modeling visually before the numerical simulation was 
performed in ANSYS AUTODYN code. and the calculated amount of TNT for the parameter 
study was 16.30 kg, 33.61 kg, and 59.57 kg shown in Figure 18, 19, and 20 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. 2D Drawing of 16.30 kg TNT Shaped Charge (Dimensions are in mm). 
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Figure 19. 2D Drawing of 33.61 kg TNT Shaped Charge (Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. 2D Drawing of 59.57 kg TNT Shaped Charge (Dimensions are in mm). 
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Second, the increase of the horizontal length of the TNT shaped charges were modeled 
and simulated using ANSYS AUTODYN code in order to obtain the incident velocity output and 
the size of the fragment produced due to TNT shaped charge for each case shown in Figure 21.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Parametric Studies of TNT Shaped Charges in Horizontal Length Increase. 
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After the simulation of the TNT shaped charges in the horizontal length increase was 
completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the incident velocity data output was obtained and the 
size of the fragment was measured the results obtained are shown in Table 8.  
 
 
 
Table 8. TNT Shaped Charges’ Results as Horizontal Length Increased. 
Horizontal 
Length 
Increase 
(mm) 
Shaped Charge 
TNT Amount 
(kg) 
Incident 
Velocity    
(m/s) 
Time of 
Incident 
Velocity 
(ms) 
Estimated Size of 
Fragment 
(mm) 
100 7.64 2039.9 0.18937 
Length: 159,  
Ø : 19 
200 16.30 2412.0 0.20870 
Length: 173,  
Ø : 19 
300 33.61 2758.3 0.40264 
Length: 185,  
Ø : 19 
700 59.57 2975.4 0.50017 
Length: 248,  
Ø : 19 
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The resulted incident velocity data was plotted versus the TNT amount as the horizontal 
length increased shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Incident Velocity versus TNT Amount Plot as Horizontal Length Increased  
with Linear Line Fitting. 
 
 
 
Figure 22 shows the linear relationship between the incident velocity of the shaped charge and 
corresponding TNT mass. Considering the value of correlation coefficient, R2= 0.8944, the 
fitting shows a good linear relationship. Thus, the incident velocity of the shaped charge 
increases as the mass of TNT with the horizontal length increases.  
After the TNT shaped charge simulation for each case was completed in ANSYS 
AUTODYN code, the fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge was modeled with the 
reinforced concrete model in ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figures 23, 24, and 
Figure 25. Then, the initial conditions and boundary conditions were applied in order to perform 
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the impact investigation simulation due to TNT shaped charge for each case on the reinforced 
concrete model in ANSYS AUTODYN code. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 16.30 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 33.61 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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Figure 25. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 59.57 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
Lastly, the reinforce concrete modeled with the fragment for each case was transferred to 
ANSYS AUTODYN code from ANSY Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figures 26, 27, 
and Figure 28. The figures represent the final simulation settings of the impact investigation on 
the reinforced concrete due to TNT shaped charge in ANSYS AUTODYN code.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Final Simulation Settings of 16.30 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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Figure 27. Final Simulation Settings of 33.61 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Final Simulation Settings of 59.57 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
After the final settings of the simulation was completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the 
fragment produced due to 16.30 kg TNT shaped charge took 21.47 ms with the incident velocity 
of 2412.0 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. The fragment was 
able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on the reinforced 
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concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the Axes, and the hole 
size was 87 mm at the front side and 105 mm at the back side shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Hole Created at Front Side due to 16.30 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Hole Created at Back Side due to 16.30 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
The fragment produced due to 33.61 kg TNT shaped charge took 18.92 ms with the 
incident velocity of 2758.3 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. 
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The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on 
the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the 
Axes, and the hole size was 90 mm at the front side and 107 mm at the back side shown in 
Figure 31 and Figure 32. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Hole Created at Front Side due to 33.61 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Hole Created at Back Side due to 33.61 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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The fragment produced due to 59.57 kg TNT shaped charge took 18.11 ms with the 
incident velocity of 2957.4 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. 
The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on 
the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the 
Axes, and the hole size was 92 mm at the front side and 110 mm at the back side shown in 
Figure 33 and Figure 34. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Hole Created at Front Side due to 59.57 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Hole Created at Back Side due to 59.57 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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From the parametric study of the horizontal length increase for each case, the diameter of 
the fragments were same, however the length of the fragments was increased. Also, the incident 
velocity of the fragments were increased. The size of holes were slightly increased as the 
horizontal length of TNT shaped charge was increased. The summary of the parametric studies 
of the horizontal length increase is shown in Table 9. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Summary Results of Horizontal Length Increase. 
Horizontal 
Length 
Increase 
(mm) 
Shaped Charge 
TNT Amount   
(kg) 
Incident 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
Estimated Size of 
Fragment 
(mm) 
Front Side 
Hole Size 
(mm) 
Back Side 
Hole Size 
(mm) 
200 16.30 2412.0 Length: 173, Ø : 19 87 105 
300 33.61 2758.3 Length: 185,Ø : 19 90 107 
700 59.57 2975.4 Length: 248, Ø : 19 92 110 
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2.4.2 Parametric Study of Vertical Length Increase 
The parametric study of increasing vertical lengths of TNT shaped charge was conducted. 
There were three cases in this parameter study. The vertical length for each case was increased in 
order to match with TNT amount in the parameter study of the horizontal length increase. Firstly, 
2D drawings were completed to calculate the amount of TNT and aim for modeling visually 
before the numerical simulation was performed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, and the calculated 
TNT amount for the parameter study was 15.35 kg, 28.86 kg, and 45.60 kg shown in Figures 35, 
36, and Figure 37 respectively. The amount of TNT calculated in the parameter study of vertical 
length increase could not be exactly same as the TNT amount calculated in the parameter study 
of horizontal length increase because the amount of TNT was calculated by the geometry. 
However, both of the parameter studies had approximately similar TNT amounts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. 2D Drawing of 15.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge (Dimensions are in mm). 
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Figure 36. 2D Drawing of 28.86 kg TNT Shaped Charge (Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37. 2D Drawing of 45.60 kg TNT Shaped Charge (Dimensions are in mm). 
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Second, the increase of the vertical length of the TNT shaped charges were modeled and 
simulated using ANSYS AUTODYN code in order to obtain the incident velocity output and the 
size of the fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge for each case shown in Figure 38.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 38. Parametric Studies of TNT Shaped Charges in Vertical Length Increase. 
 
 
 
After the simulation of the TNT shaped charges in the vertical length increase was 
completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the incident velocity data output was obtained and the 
size of the fragment was measured by using axis shown in Table 10. However, 45.60 kg TNT 
shaped charge was not considered for the simulation of the impact investigation on the reinforced 
concrete in this case. This was because the shape of the fragment was assumed as the bullet 
shape, however the shape of the fragment in this case was not the bullet shape. Possible reason 
why the shape of the fragment produced by 45.60 kg TNT shaped charge could be different is 
that the vertical length was too long compared to its horizontal length. The gap between TNT 
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and the tip of corn of the copper liner was too short, thus the fragment wasn’t able to be shaped 
as bullet shape by 45.60 kg TNT shaped charge. 
 
 
 
Table 10. TNT Shaped Charges’ Results as Vertical Length Increased. 
Vertical 
Length 
Increase    
(mm) 
Shaped Charge 
TNT Amount 
(kg) 
Incident 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
Time of 
Incident 
Velocity 
(ms) 
Estimated Size of 
Fragment    
(mm) 
100 7.64 2039.9 0.18937 Length: 159, Ø : 19 
190 15.35 2134.5 0.27829 Length: 104, Ø : 24 
273 28.86 2159.6 0.40906 Length: 112, Ø : 29 
363 45.60 2153.2 0.56105 Not Available 
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The incident velocity data resulted was plotted versus the TNT amount as the horizontal 
length increased shown in Figure 39. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Incident Velocity versus TNT Amount Plot as Vertical Length Increased  
with Linear Line Fitting. 
 
 
 
Figure 39 shows the linear relationship between the incident velocity of the shaped charge and 
corresponding TNT mass. Considering the value of correlation coefficient, R2= 0.5665, the 
fitting is not highly within a good linear relationship. However, the value of correlation 
coefficient, R2= 0.9249, shows a good polynomial relationship with the second order polynomial 
equation shown in Figure 40.  
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Figure 40. Incident Velocity versus TNT Amount Plot as Vertical length Increased 
with Polynomial Fitting. 
 
 
 
Therefore, the incident velocity of the shaped charge is not considered to be increasing or 
decreasing as the mass of TNT with the vertical length increases.  
 
After the TNT shaped charge simulation for each case was completed in ANSYS 
AUTODYN code, the fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge was modeled with the 
reinforced concrete model in ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 41 and 
Figure 42. Then, the initial conditions and boundary conditions were applied in order to perform 
the impact investigation simulation due to TNT shaped charge for each case on the reinforced 
concrete model in ANSYS AUTODYN code. 
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Figure 41. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 15.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 28.86 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
Lastly, the reinforce concrete modeled with the fragment for each case was transferred to 
ANSYS AUTODYN code from ANSY Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 43 and 44. 
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The figures represent the final simulation settings of the impact investigation on the reinforced 
concrete due to TNT shaped charge in ANSYS AUTODYN code.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 43. Final Simulation Settings of 15.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Final Simulation Settings of 28.86 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
After the final settings of the simulation was completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the 
fragment produce due to 15.35 kg TNT shaped charge took 24.57 ms with the incident velocity 
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of 2134.5 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. The fragment was 
able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on the reinforced 
concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the Axes, and the hole 
size was 135 mm at the front side and 153 mm at the back side shown in Figure 45 and 46. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45. Hole Created at Front Side due to 15.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46. Hole Created at Back Side due to 15.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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The fragment produced due to 28.86 kg TNT shaped charge took 24.75 ms with the 
incident velocity of 2134.5 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. 
The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on 
the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the 
Axes, and the hole size was 138 mm at the front side and 155 mm at the back side shown in 
Figure 47 and Figure 48. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Hole Created at Front Side due to 28.86 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48. Hole Created at Back Side due to 28.86 kg TNT Shaped Charge. 
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From the parametric study of the vertical length increase for each case, the diameter and 
length of the fragments were increased. However, the incident velocity of the fragments were 
constant. Also, the size of holes were increased compared to the parametric study of the 
horizontal length increase. The summary of the parametric study of the vertical length increase is 
shown in Table 11. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Summary Results of Vertical Length Increase. 
Vertical     
Length 
Increase 
(mm) 
Shaped Charge 
TNT Amount   
(kg) 
Incident 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
Estimated Size of 
Fragment   
(mm) 
Front Side 
Hole Size 
(mm) 
Back Side 
Hole Size 
(mm) 
190 15.35 2134.5 
Length: 104, 
Ø : 24 
135 153 
273 28.86 2159.6 
Length: 112,  
Ø : 29 
138 155 
363 59.57 2153.2 Not Available Not Available Not Available 
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2.4.3 Parametric Study of Liner Thickness Increase 
The parametric study of increasing liner thickness of TNT shaped charge was conducted. 
There were three cases in this parametric study. The liner thickness for each case was increased 
twice form the first designed TNT shaped charge. Firstly, 2D drawings were completed to 
calculate the amount of TNT before the numerical simulation was performed, however the 
calculated amount TNT was 7.64 kg for all three cases and only thickness of liners was increased, 
thus this step was for aiming to model visually in ANSYS AUYODYN code shown in Figures 
49, 50, and Figure 51.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 49. 2D Drawing of 7.64 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 9.0 mm Liner Thickness 
(Dimensions are in mm). 
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Figure 50. 2D Drawing of 7.64 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 13.5 mm Liner Thickness 
(Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51. 2D Drawing of 7.64 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 18.0 mm Liner Thickness 
(Dimensions are in mm). 
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Second, the increase of the liner thickness of the TNT shaped charges were modeled and 
simulated using ANSYS AUTODYN code in order to obtain the incident velocity output and the 
size of the fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge for each case shown in Figure 52. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52. Parametric Studies of TNT Shaped Charges in Liner Thickness Increase. 
 
 
 
After the simulation of the TNT shaped charges in the liner thickness increase was 
completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the incident velocity data output was obtained shown in 
Table 12. However, the simulation of the impact investigation was not performed in this case, 
because the fragment did not keep flowing forward as time passed in ANSYS AUTODYN code 
unlike the parametric studies of the horizontal length increase and the vertical length increase 
even if the fragments had a high incident velocity. One of reasons why the fragment did not flow 
forward for each case in this parametric study was that the amount of TNT was not enough to 
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make the fragment flow forward compared to its liner thickness. The thickness of liners was 
increased which means the fragment mass could be increased, thus more TNT mass would be 
needed to keep the fragment flowing forward (the liner thickness without increasing was 4.5 
mm). Therefore, the fragment in this case assumed not to be able to reach the reinforced concrete. 
The size of the fragment was not measured, but it increased as the liner thickness increased by 
the sight observation compared to the parametric studies of the horizontal length increase and 
vertical length increase. Thus, this parametric study was used only to observe physical 
phenomena after increasing the thickness of liners. 
 
 
 
Table 12. TNT Shaped Charges’ Results as Liner Thickness Increased. 
Shaped Charge 
TNT Amount 
(kg) 
Liner Thickness 
Increase 
 (mm) 
Incident 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
7.64 4.5 2039.9 
7.64 9.0 1673.7 
7.64 13.5 1268.8 
7.64 18.0 1140.0 
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The incident velocity data resulted was plotted versus the TNT amount as the horizontal 
length increased shown in Figure 53. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53. Incident Velocity versus TNT Amount Plot as Liner Thickness Increased  
with Linear Line Fitting. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53 shows the linear relationship between the incident velocity of the shaped charge and 
corresponding TNT mass. Considering the value of correlation coefficient, R2= 0.9524, the 
fitting shows a good linear relationship. Thus, the incident velocity of the shaped charge 
decreases as the mass of TNT with the liner thickness increases.  
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2.5 Final Design Considerations 
   From the parametric studies, the horizontal length increase resulted in the increasing of 
incident velocity. The vertical length increase resulted in a constant velocity, however the size of 
holes that was created on the reinforced concrete model was larger than the size of holes created 
in the parametric study of the horizontal length increase. Lastly, the liner thickness increase 
resulted in decreasing of the incident velocity, however the size of the fragment was the largest 
among these parametric studies. 
  Based on parametric studies and observations, the final design of the TNT shaped charge 
was modeled and simulated. From the parametric study of vertical length increase, the length of 
273 mm was considered, and the length of 400 mm was considered from the parametric study of 
the horizontal length increase. This was because the length of 273 mm in the vertical length with 
the 28.86 kg TNT shaped charge created the largest size of the hole at the front and the back side 
on the reinforced concrete model, and its corresponding length in the horizontal length was 400 
mm with 33.61 kg TNT shaped charge. For the liner thickness, the fragment did not flow 
forward in the simulation, thus the liner thickness was increased with the considered horizontal 
and vertical length for the final design selection. 
 
2.5.1 Final Design Trial 1 
Firstly, 2D drawings were completed to calculate the amount of TNT before the 
numerical simulation was performed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, and the calculated TNT 
amount was 143.35 kg. With this TNT amount, the liner thickness was increased as 9.0 mm and 
13.5 mm shown in Figure 54 and Figure 55 respectively. 
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Figure 54. 2D Drawing of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 9.0 mm Liner Thickness 
(Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
Figure 55. 2D Drawing of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 13.5 mm Liner Thickness 
(Dimensions are in mm). 
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Second, the increase of the liner thickness of the TNT shaped charges with both 
increasing lengths in horizontal and vertical direction was modeled and simulated using ANSYS 
AUTODYN code in order to obtain the incident velocity output and the size of the fragment 
produced due to the TNT shaped charge for each case and is shown in Figure 56. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56. Final Design Trial 1 of TNT Shaped Charge with Liner Thickness Increase. 
 
 
 
The 143.35 kg of TNT shaped charge with the 9mm liner thickness resulted in the 
incident velocity of 2482.3 m/s, and the size of the fragment was measured with the diameter of 
37 mm and the length of 235mm. Also, the 143.35 kg of TNT shaped charge with 13.5 mm liner 
thickness resulted in the incident velocity of 2040.0 m/s, and the size of the fragment was 
measured with the diameter of 55 mm and the length of 225 mm. 
After the TNT shaped charge simulation for each case was completed in ANSYS 
AUTODYN code, the fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge was modeled with the 
reinforced concrete model in ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 57 and 
Figure 58. Then, the initial conditions and boundary conditions were applied in order to perform 
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the impact investigation simulation due to TNT shaped charge for each case on the reinforced 
concrete model in ANSYS AUTODYN code. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                      
with 9.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 58. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                
with 13.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
Lastly, the reinforce concrete modeled with the fragment for each case was transferred to 
ANSYS AUTODYN code from ANSY Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 59 and 60. 
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The figures represent the final simulation settings of the impact investigation on the reinforced 
concrete due to TNT shaped charge in ANSYS AUTODYN code. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59. Final Simulation Settings of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                                             
with 9.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 60. Final Simulation Settings of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                                     
with 13.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
After the final settings of the simulation was completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the 
fragment produced due to 143.35 kg TNT shaped charge with 9.0 mm liner thickness took 20.99 
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-ms with the incident velocity of 2482.3 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced 
concrete model. The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it 
created a hole on the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal 
direction using the Axes, and the hole size was 143 mm at the front side and 162 mm at the back 
side shown in Figure 61 and Figure 62.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 61. Hole Created at Front Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge 
with 9.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62. Hole Created at Back Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                               
with 9.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
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143.35 kg TNT shaped charge with 13.5 mm liner thickness took 24.96 ms with the 
incident velocity of 2040.0 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. 
The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on 
the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the 
Axes, and the hole size was 193 mm at the front side and 219 mm at the back side shown in 
Figure 63 and Figure 64. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63. Hole Created at Front Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge 
with 13.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64. Hole Created at Back Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge 
with 13.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
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2.5.2 Final Design Trial 2 
The resulted hole sizes of both cases were not enough that a person can pass through, 
thus additional simulations were performed with increasing the liner thickness. There were two 
cases. The first simulation was with the 143.35 kg of TNT shaped charge increasing the liner 
thickness of 18.0 mm, and the other simulation was with 143.35 kg of TNT shaped charge 
increasing the liner thickness of 22.5 mm. 
Firstly, 2D drawings were completed for aiming to model visually before the numerical 
simulation was performed in ANSYS AUTODYN code. The 2D drawings of 143.35 kg TNT 
shaped charge with 18.0 mm and 143.35 kg TNT shaped charge with 22.5 mm are shown in 
Figure 65 and Figure 66. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65. 2D Drawing of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 18.0 mm Liner Thickness  
(Dimensions are in mm). 
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Figure 66. 2D Drawing of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge with 22.5 mm Liner Thickness 
(Dimensions are in mm). 
 
 
 
Second, the increase of the liner thickness of the TNT shaped charges with both 
increasing lengths in horizontal and vertical direction was modeled and simulated using ANSYS 
AUTODYN code in order to obtain the incident velocity output and the size of the fragment 
produced due to the TNT shaped charge for each case shown in Figure 67.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 67. Final Design Trial 2 of TNT Shaped Charge with Liner Thickness Increase. 
 64 
 
 
 
The 143.35 kg of TNT shaped charge with the liner thickness of 18 mm resulted in the 
incident velocity of 1781.2 m/s, and the size of the fragment was measured with the diameter of 
81 mm and the length of 222mm. Also, the 143.35 kg of TNT shaped charge with liner thickness 
of 22.5mm resulted in the incident velocity of 1060.8 m/s, and the size of the fragment was 
measured with the diameter of 93 mm and the length of 221 mm. 
After the TNT shaped charge simulation for each case was completed in ANSYS 
AUTODYN code, the fragment produced due to the TNT shaped charge was modeled with the 
reinforced concrete model in ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 68 and 69.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 68. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge           
with 18.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 69. Reinforced Concrete Wall with Fragment due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge          
with 22.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
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Lastly, the reinforce concrete modeled with the fragment for each case was transferred to 
ANSYS AUTODYN code from ANSY Explicit Dynamic STR code shown in Figure 70 and 71. 
The figures represent the final simulation settings of the impact investigation on the reinforced 
concrete due to TNT shaped charge in ANSYS AUTODYN code. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 70. Final Simulation Settings of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge 
with 18.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
Figure 71. Final Simulation Settings of 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                                       
with 22.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
After the final settings of the simulation was completed in ANSYS AUTODYN code, the 
fragment produce due to 143.35 kg TNT shaped charge with 18.0 mm liner thickness took 28.75 
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-ms with the incident velocity of 1781.2 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced 
concrete model. The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it 
created a hole on the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal 
direction using the Axes, and the hole size was 252 mm at the front side and 279 mm at the back 
side shown in Figure 72 and Figure 73.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 72. Hole Created at Front Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                         
with 18.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 73. Hole Created at Back Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                                
with 18.0 mm Liner Thickness. 
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143.35 kg TNT shaped charge with 22.5 mm liner thickness took 31.82 ms with the 
incident velocity of 1060.8 m/s in order to create an impact on the reinforced concrete model. 
The fragment was able to penetrate the reinforced concrete model fully, and it created a hole on 
the reinforced concrete model. The hole size was measured in horizontal direction using the 
Axes, and the hole size was 342 mm at the front side and 364 mm at the back side shown in 
Figure 74 and Figure 75. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 74. Hole Created at Front Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                       
with 22.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 75. Hole Created at Back Side due to 143.35 kg TNT Shaped Charge                                 
with 22.5 mm Liner Thickness. 
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   After all simulations for the final design was conducted, 143.35 kg TNT shaped Charge 
with 22.5 mm that the hole size created 342 mm at the front side and 364 mm at the back side on 
the reinforced concrete model was considered as the final design of TNT shaped charge. The 
summary results of final design simulations are shown in Table 13. 
 
 
 
Table 13. Summary Results of Final Design Trials. 
Shaped Charge 
TNT Amount   
(kg) 
Liner 
Thickness 
Increase 
(mm) 
Incident 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
Time of 
Incident 
Velocity 
(ms) 
Estimated Size 
of Fragment 
(mm) 
Front Side 
Hole Size 
(mm) 
Back Side 
Hole Size 
(mm) 
143.35 9.0 2482.3 0.44249 
Length: 235, 
Ø : 37 
143 162 
143.35 13.5 2040.0 0.49222 
Length: 225, 
Ø : 55 
193 219 
143.35 18.0 1781.2 0.33438 
Length: 222, 
Ø : 81 
252 279 
143.35 22.5 1060.8 0.33254 
Length: 225, 
Ø : 55 
342 364 
 
 
 
This hole size was checked to perform the physical protection system (PPS) for 
vulnerability assessments to a hypothetical nuclear research reactor facility, and investigation of 
different hole size could be performed through more parametric studies. From the actual 
experiment of TNT shaped charge by reference paper21, the hole size created on a steel plate 
target was same at the front side and the back side. However, the hole size created on the 
reinforced concrete model was slightly different at the front side and the back side. Possible 
reasons could be that steel is a homogeneous material, but the reinforced concrete is 
heterogeneous consisted of the concrete and reinforced steel bars. Also, concrete itself is 
heterogeneous material consisted of water, cement and aggregates. 
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3. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
 
3.1 Vulnerability Assessments Introduction 
The vulnerability of Physical Protection System (PPS) was analyzed for a hypothetical 
nuclear research reactor facility using Adversary Sequence Diagram (ASD) to estimate the 
probability of interruption (PI) of the adversary who is attacking the facility with a shaped charge. 
The ASD was used to evaluate the PPS vulnerability for approaching the desired target in the 
research reactor facility by the adversary minimizing the probability of detection (PD) and a 
delay time (tD). Also, the calculation of PI was for the most vulnerable path to reach the desired 
target. 
3.2 Hypothetical Scenario Descriptions  
The hypothetical scenario can be described as follows22: 
“In this scenario, the adversary is a two-person team, and they were members of a 
domestic terrorist group. The group were funded $ 35,000 USD for a single attack, and their 
previous tactics was deceit, stealth, and diversion using car bombs and suicide bombs. Also, the 
group had displayed the ability to gather intelligence about target using open source collection, 
external surveillance of targets and through insiders. They also had displayed the ability to use 
covert means of communication with a very limited ability for counter surveillance. The group 
had proficiency with and possession of knives, handguns, semi-automatic assault rifles, and high 
explosives. They had access to high-grade military explosive materials. Hand and power tools, 
and light cars or trucks were commercially available. Lastly, the group had basic electronic skills, 
however they had very little radiation and radiation protection skills, limited high explosives 
manufacturing skills, and no viable cyber skills.” 
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“The site consists a small research reactor on a university campus. The reactor was a 5-
MW pool-type reactor using high-enriched uranium fuel. The facility consists of the reactor, 
associated laboratories and hot cells, and offices for employees and researchers. Outer boundary 
to the site is a chain link mesh fence. Outside that fence is considered offsite, and inside that 
fence is considered as the protected area. Employees, researchers, and visitors must wear a badge 
on site at all time.” General sketch of the facility is shown in Figure 76. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 76. Dimensions of Hypothetical Nuclear Research Reactor Facility  
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
“There were three guards on site at all times, and the guards worked 8 hour shifts. Normally one 
guard would be located at the front entrance to the building at P1 and two guards would be 
located in the alarm station at P2. The Response Force Time (RFT), the time that would take for 
the response to deploy and engage an adversary once an alarm has occurred is 90 seconds.” 
 “For the site entrance procedure, employees, researchers and visitors would park in a 
parking lot at offsite, and then they would walk through the steel turnstile to enter the site. The 
entrance to the university campus and the access to the parking lot is open to the public. 
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Employees are required to use a badge swipe to unlock the turnstile. Visitors are required to 
contact the guard at P2 using a telephone and identify themselves, then the guard would remotely 
unlock the turnstile. Delivery vehicles are required to stop at the vehicle gate and identify 
themselves to the guard at P2, then the guard would remotely unlock and open the gate for the 
vehicle. All alarms for detection elements are displayed at P2, and the assessment would be 
performed by camera or by deploying one of the guards from P2 to manually assess alarms.” 
Microwave sensors, balance magnetic switches, electromagnetic lock, and camera are used for 
the exterior detection elements. General schematic of the location of guards with the exterior 
elements is shown in Figure 77.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 77. Location of Guards with Exterior Detection Elements  
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
   “The inside of the main building is consisted of offices, laboratories, storage areas, and a 
loading zone. The entrance to the facility is through the entry vestibule. The reactor containment 
is located in the center of the building and consisted of 30 -cm thick concrete walls with No. 4 
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rebar. The reactor sits in a pool within a concrete reactor pedestal that is 8-m high, and the 
pedestal is composed of 60 -cm concrete with No. 6 rebar. All alarms are assessed via cameras at 
P2 or via manual assessment by one of guards at P2.” Detailed schematic of the building interior 
is shown in Figure 78. For detection elements in the building, microwave sensors, balance 
magnetic switches, and cameras are used, and detailed schematic of detection elements in the 
building interior is shown in Figure 79. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 78. Detailed Schematic of Building Interior  
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 79. Detailed Schematic of Detection Elements in Building Interior 
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
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3.3 Methodology and Procedure  
The probability of interruption (PI) of the adversary by the PPS calculation was 
performed in order to investigate how a nuclear facility could be weakened by outsider 
adversaries if they use the TNT shaped charge or other equipment to sabotage. 
 The first step was to create the ASD to identify the physical areas and protection layers 
shown in Figure 80. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 80. Schematic of Physical Areas and Protection Layers for Reactor Facility  
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
Second, the ADS was constructed for the reactor. The path elements were identified for 
each path to enter to the critical equipment room from the offsite. Each path element had a 
probability of detection represented as PD and a mean delay time represented as tD. First, the 
fence-line is represented as FEN, the vehicle gate represented as VHD, and the entrance door 
represented as DOR from offsite to the protected area. Second, the double pedestrian door entry 
vestibule is represented as PER, and wall surface represented as SUR, and the metal roll up 
vehicle door represented as VHD from the protected are into the building. Next, there the 
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wooden door or steel door is represented as DOR, wall surface represented as SUR, and the 
heavy vehicle door represented as VHD from the building into the reactor containment. Last, 
there the wooden door is represented as DOR and wall surface represented as SUR from the 
reactor containment into the critical equipment room. After traversing through a combination of 
these protection elements, the adversary would be able to reach to the target shown in Figure 81. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 81. Adversary Sequence Diagram for Reactor 
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
After the ASD for the reactor was completed, a protection element to pass through from 
one physical area to the next was chosen with minimizing detection at the beginning of a task 
and delay time near the end of a task. For example, choosing VHD and DOR from the offsite 
into the protected area would be incorrect pathway with 100% detection, because those elements 
require a badge and identification to check by a guard at P2. Therefore, the lock at the gate 
remain locked without a badge and identification. Also, choosing a protection element of PER 
from the protected area into the building would have essentially 100% detection for the similar 
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reason as that of the VHD. There is the guard at location at P1 next to PER, thus this pathway 
would be incorrect too. The possible selection of a protect element for each pathway is shown in 
Figure 82 (highlighted in yellow). 
 
 
 
     
Figure 82. Adversary Sequence Diagram with Possible Adversary Sequence Paths 
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
The PI value was calculated based on the probability of detection and the probability of 
non-detection with assumptions of the delay time at each pathway given by23: 
𝛽𝐷
𝑗
= 1 − PD
j                 (8) 
 
  
 
            PI = 1 − 𝛽𝐷                (10) 
Where, PDj is the probability of detection at protection element j, βDj is the probability of non-
detection at protection element j, βD is the combined probability of non-detection, and PI is the 
probability of interruption.  
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In addition, the probability of interruption could be computed using Estimate of 
Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model Excel which is a simple calculation tool that 
quantitatively illustrates the effect of changing physical protection parameters along a specific 
path.23 A sample of EASI model input and output is shown in Table 14. 
 
 
 
Table 14. EASI Model Sample. 
  
Estimate of 
Adversary 
Sequence 
Interruption 
Probability of Interruption: 0.83 
Probability of 
Alarm 
Communication 
System Response Time 
(in seconds) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
 0.9 90 27 
 
Task 
 
Description 
 
PD 
 
Location 
Delay Time 
(seconds) 
Time 
Left 
(seconds) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Penetrates the Fence  0.7625 FEN 12 3.6 198 
2 
Run to the metal roll-up metal 
vehicle gate 
0.05 VHD 10 3.0 186 
3 Penetrate the vehicle gate  0.975 VHD 132 39.6 176 
4 Run to the building 0.025 VHD 5 1.5 44 
5 
Penetrates 5-cm wooden door, 
run around the hallway, and 
penetrate 0.75-cm steel door 
0.647 DOR 67 0.3 39 
6 
Run to the reactor 
containment area  
DOR 5 1.5 
38 
7 
Penetrate 5 cm wooden door 
to enter into the critical 
equipment room   
DOR 12 3.6 
33 
8 
Enter into the critical 
equipment room  
DOR 3 0.9 
21 
9 
Sabotage the reactor vessel                                              
Or, steal special nuclear 
materials   
Target 18 5.4 18 
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In this paper, the probability of interruption was calculated only for the vulnerability 
assessments to the hypothetical nuclear research reactor facility if adversary used TNT shaped 
charge for approaching the desired target. However, the vulnerability assessments can be 
analyzed further by the estimation of risk which calculates the survival rate of the adversary. The 
estimation of the risk to the facility of an adversary gaining access to, or stealing, critical assets 
is given by23: 
Risk= PAttack *[1-( PInterruptionPNeutralization)]* C          (9) 
Where, PAttack is the probability of an adversary attack during a period of time with the value 
from 0 (no chance at all of attack) to 1.0 (certainty of attack), PInterruption is the probability of 
interruption with the value from 0 (no chance at all of interruption) to 1.0 (certainty of 
interruption), PNeutralization is the probability of neutralizing the adversary by the guards with the 
value from 0 (no chance at all of neutralizing the adversary) and 1.0 (certainty of neutralizing the 
adversary), and C is the consequence of the loss by the attack with the value from 0 (no chance at 
all of consequence) to 1.0 (certainty consequence). 
 In the estimation of risk, the value of PAttack and C is subjective, and only the value of 
PInterruption and PNeutralization can be calculated for the estimation. The probability of interruption,  
could be improved by the probability of detection and delay time depending on where the 
adversary chooses the paths. The probability of neutralization, PNeutralization, could be depended on 
physical protection systems in the facility such as detection elements and the force response time 
by guards as an example. Thus, these two terms are effective for the survival rate of the 
adversary, and this analysis can be worked as a future work. 
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3.4 Assumptions for Calculation of Probability of Interruption 
   There were several assumptions to calculate the probability of interruption for the given  
PD and tD values of each protection element along the adversary path. These assumptions were 
made based on the sample pathway shown in Figure 82.22,23 
1. Response Force Time (RFT) was assumed to be 90 seconds. 
2. The standard deviation for all assumed delay times to be 30%. 
3. From the offsite to the protected area: 
• From the delay times tables, a mean time of 12 s was assumed to penetrate the fence 
(FEN), followed by 10 s to crawl past the microwave sensor and run the rest of the 20 
-m to the vehicle door of the building. Also, a chance of being seen by the cameras 
was assumed to be 5% during this 10 s. 
• FEN: 2.5 -m chain link mesh fence with outriggers.  
• Camera and Microwave Sensor down each fence-line. 
• PD for crawling through microwave sensor is (M-H) 0.5-0.7 for one person. For 2 
intruders the microwave sensors non-detection probability,  
βD = (0.5)(0.5) = 0.25 → PD = 0.75. 
• Additionally, there might be a 5% chance of being seen by the cameras while 
climbing the fence. βD = (0.25)(0.95) = 0.2375 → PD = 0.7625. 
4. From the protected area to the building: 
• Entry vestibule consisted of two personnel doors, microwave sensor, balance 
magnetic switch, camera, and guard. PD ≈ 0.95. 
• Wall surface was 15 -cm thick concrete with No.4 rebar. PD ≈ 0.95. This task would 
not be possible to penetrate without explosives. 
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• VHD: Sheet metal rollup vehicle door, mean delay time was assumed to of 132 s to 
penetrate sheet metal rollup vehicle door with fire ax, no detection by balanced 
magnetic switch. Approximately 65% chance of being detected by the passive camera 
was assumed during this 132 s. PD= 0.65 
• Then about 5 s to run to the building. A chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 0.025% during this 5 s. PD= 0.025 
5. From the building to the reactor containment: 
• SUR: 30 -cm thick concrete wall with No. 4 rebar. PD ≈ 0.95.  
This task would not be possible to penetrate without explosives. 
• VHD: Heavy vehicle door 19 -mm steel, 10 -cm air space, 1.3-mm steel. Two large-
hinged hasps and high-security padlocks from the inside. To penetrate the heavy 
vehicle door would require an equipment the weight of which is not possible for the 
adversary to carry 
• DOR: This path would include penetrating the 5 -cm wood pedestrian door to the 
building hallway, running around the hallway to the 0.75 -cm steel plate door, and 
penetrating the 0.75 -cm steel plate door to enter the reactor containment. 
1. The adversary would penetrate the 5 -cm wood pedestrian door to the hallway 
assuming the mean delay time of 12 s to penetrate the 5 -cm wood door with fire 
ax, and also there is a chance of being seen by the passive camera and was 
assumed to be 5% during this task. PD = 0.05. 
2. The adversary would run around the hallway to the 0.75 -cm steel plate door with 
assuming 25 s to run the hallways to the door, passive camera. PD = 0.125. 
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3. The adversary would penetrate the 0.75 -cm steel plate door to enter the reactor 
containment assuming the mean delay time of 30 s to penetrate with cutting torch, 
passive camera. PD = 0.15. 
Total delay time would be 67 s to enter reactor containment with all these tasks, also 
assuming a PD = 0.5 from drawing attention within the building.  
Therefore, βD = (0.95)(0.875)(0.85)(0.5) = 0.353 → PD = 0.647. 
6. From the reactor containment into the critical equipment room 
• SUR: 10 -cm thick concrete wall with No.5 rebar. PD ≈ 0.95.  
This task would not be possible without explosives. 
• DOR: 5 -cm wood pedestrian door with balance magnetic switch and electromagnetic 
lock assuming the mean delay time of 12 s to penetrate door with fire ax, and 
additional 3 s to run to the target before the 18 s to set the 10 kg explosive.  
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3.5 Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Several Pathways 
Unlike the sample pathway, the adversary would be able to use TNT shaped charges in 
order to sabotage the nuclear facility or steal SNM after they were able to break into the facility. 
A venerability analysis for calculating the PI was performed with the detailed information of the 
hypothetical facility plan. There were three different pathways for this analysis in order to 
investigate the most vulnerable paths for this facility.  
3.5.1 Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Pathway 1 
The ASD was created with the adversary sequence paths to minimize the delay time and 
the probability of detection shown in Figure 83, and required tasks for the adversary are shown 
below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 83. Adversary Sequence Diagram for Pathway 1  
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
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1. Task 1, from the offsite to the protected area: 
• From the delay times tables, a mean time of 12 s was assumed to penetrate the fence, 
followed by 10 s to crawl past the microwave sensor and run the rest of the 20 -m to 
the vehicle door of the building. Also, a chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 5% during this 10 s. 
• FEN: 2.5 -m chain link mesh fence with outriggers.  
• Camera and Microwave Sensor down each fence-line. 
• PD for crawling through microwave sensor is (M-H) 0.5-0.7 for one person. For 2 
intruders the microwave sensors non-detection probability,  
βD = (0.5)(0.5) = 0.25 → PD = 0.75. 
• Additionally, there might be a 5% chance of being seen by the cameras while 
climbing the fence. βD = (0.25)(0.95) = 0.2375 → PD = 0.7625. 
2. Task 2, from the protected area to the building: 
• VHD: Sheet metal rollup vehicle door, mean delay time was assumed to of 132 s to 
penetrate sheet metal rollup vehicle door with fire ax, no detection by balanced 
magnetic switch. Approximately 65% chance of being detected by the passive camera 
was assumed during this 132 s. PD= 0.65 
• Then about 5 s to run to the building. A chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 0.025% during this 5 s. PD= 0.025 
3. Task 3, from the building to the reactor containment: 
• SUR: 30 -cm thick concrete wall with No. 4 rebar. PD ≈ 0.95.  
The adversary would use a TNT shaped charge to penetrate the concrete wall 
assuming 1 s to penetrate, also a PD = 0.5 from drawing attention within the building.  
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Therefore, βD = (0.05)(0.5) = 0.025 → PD = 0.975 
4. Task 4, from the reactor containment into the critical equipment room 
• DOR: 5 -cm wood pedestrian door with balance magnetic switch and electromagnetic 
lock assuming the mean delay time of 12 s to penetrate door with fire ax, and 
additional 3 s to run to the target before the 18 s to set the 10 kg explosive.  
The value of PI for this pathway was calculated with these assumptions, PD, tD, RFT using EASI 
model Excel tool shown in Table 14, and the calculated value of PI value was 0.70. 
 
 
 
Table 15. Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Pathway 1 Using EASI Model. 
  
Estimate of 
Adversary 
Sequence 
Interruption 
Probability of Interruption: 0.70 
Probability of 
Alarm 
Communication 
System Response Time 
(in seconds) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
 0.9 90 27 
 
Task 
 
Description 
 
PD 
 
Location 
Delay Time 
(seconds) 
Time 
Left 
(seconds) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Penetrates the Fence  0.7625 FEN 12 3.6 198 
2 
Run to the metal roll-up 
vehicle gate 
0.05 VHD 10 3.0 
186 
3 Penetrate the vehicle gate  0.65 VHD 132 39.6 
176 
4 Run to the building 0.025 VHD 5 1.5 44 
5 
Penetrates 30 -cm thick 
concrete wall using TNT 
shaped charge to enter into 
the reactor containment area 
0.975 SUR 1 0.3 39 
6 
Run to the reactor 
containment area   
SUR 5 1.5 
38 
7 
Penetrate 5 -cm wooden door 
to enter into the critical 
equipment room    
DOR 12 3.6 33 
8 
Enter into the critical 
equipment room   
DOR 3 0.9 21 
9 Sabotage the reactor vessel                                                 Target 18 5.4 18 
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3.5.2 Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Pathway 2 
The adversary sequence diagram was created with the adversary sequence paths to 
minimize the delay time and the probability of detection shown in Figure 84, and required tasks 
for the adversary are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 84. Adversary Sequence Diagram for Pathway 2 
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
1. Task 1, from the offsite to the protected area: 
• From the delay times tables, a mean time of 12 s was assumed to penetrate the fence, 
followed by 10 s to crawl past the microwave sensor and run the rest of the 20 -m to 
the vehicle door of the building. Also, a chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 5% during this 10 s. 
• FEN: 2.5-m chain link mesh fence with outriggers.  
• Camera and Microwave Sensor down each fence-line. 
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• PD for crawling through microwave sensor is (M-H) 0.5-0.7 for one person. For 2 
intruders the non-detection probability of the microwave sensors, 
 βD = (0.5)(0.5) = 0.25 → PD = 0.75. 
• Additionally, there might be a 5% chance of being seen by the cameras while 
climbing the fence. βD = (0.25)(0.95) = 0.2375 → PD = 0.7625. 
2. Task 2, from the protected area to the building: 
• Wall surface was 15 -cm thick concrete with No.4 rebar. PD ≈ 0.95.  
The adversary would use a TNT shaped charge to penetrate the concrete wall 
assuming 1 s to penetrate, also a PD = 0.5 from drawing attention within the building.  
Therefore, βD = (0.05)(0.5) = 0.025 → PD = 0.975 
• Then about 5 s to run to the building. A chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 0.025% during this 5 s. PD= 0.025 
3. Task 3, from the building to the reactor containment: 
• DOR: This path would include penetrating the 5 -cm wood pedestrian door to the 
building hallway, running around the hallway to the 0.75-cm steel plate door, and 
penetrating the 0.75 -cm steel plate door to enter the reactor containment. 
1. The adversary would penetrate the 5 -cm wood pedestrian door to the hallway 
assuming the mean delay time of 12 s to penetrate the 5 -cm wood door with fire 
ax, and also a chance of being seen by the passive camera was assumed to be 5% 
during this task. PD = 0.05. 
2. The adversary would run around the hallway to the 0.75 -cm steel plate door with 
assuming 25 s to run the hallways to the door, passive camera. PD = 0.125. 
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3. The adversary would penetrate the 0.75 -cm steel plate door to enter the reactor 
containment assuming the mean delay time of 30 s to penetrate with cutting torch, 
passive camera. PD = 0.15. 
Total delay time would be 67 s to enter reactor containment with all these tasks, also 
assuming a PD = 0.5 from drawing attention within the building.  
Therefore, βD = (0.95)(0.875)(0.85)(0.5) = 0.353 → PD = 0.647. 
4. Task 4, from the reactor containment into the critical equipment room 
• DOR: 5 -cm wood pedestrian door with balance magnetic switch and electromagnetic 
lock assuming the mean delay time of 12 s to penetrate door with fire ax, and 
additional 3 s to run to the target before the 18 s to set the 10 kg explosive.  
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The value of PI for this pathway was calculated with these assumptions, PD, tD, RFT using EASI 
model Excel tool shown in Table 15, and the calculated value of PI value was 0.76. 
 
 
 
Table 16. Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Pathway 2 Using EASI Model. 
  
Estimate of 
Adversary 
Sequence 
Interruption 
Probability of Interruption: 0.76 
Probability of 
Alarm 
Communication 
System Response Time 
(in seconds) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
 0.9 90 27 
 
Task 
 
Description 
 
PD 
 
Location 
Delay Time 
(seconds) 
Time 
Left 
(seconds) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Penetrates the Fence  0.7625 FEN 12 3.6 133 
2 
Run to the metal roll-up 
vehicle gate 
0.05 VHD 10 3.0 121 
3 
Penetrate 15 -cm thick 
concrete wall next to the 
vehicle gate using TNT 
shaped charge to enter into 
the building 
0.975 SUR 1 0.3 111 
4 Run to the building 0.025 SUR 5 1.5 110 
5 
Penetrate 5 -cm wooden 
door, run around the 
hallway, penetrate 0.75 -cm 
steel door to enter into the 
reactor containment area 
0.647 DOR 67 20.1 105 
6 
Run to the reactor 
containment area 
 DOR 5 1.5 38 
7 
Penetrate the 5 -cm wooden 
door to enter into the critical 
equipment room  
 DOR 12 3.6 33 
8 
Enter into the critical 
equipment room 
 DOR 3 0.9 21 
9 Sabotage the reactor vessel                                               Target 18 5.4 18 
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3.5.3 Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Pathway 3 
The adversary sequence diagram was created with the adversary sequence paths to 
minimize the delay time and the probability of detection shown in Figure 85, and required tasks 
for the adversary are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 85. Adversary Sequence Diagram for Pathway 3  
Reprinted with Permission from22. 
 
 
 
1. Task 1, from the offsite to the protected area: 
• From the delay times tables, a mean time of 12 s was assumed to penetrate the fence, 
followed by 10 s to crawl past the microwave sensor and run the rest of the 20-m to 
the vehicle door of the building. Also, a chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 5% during this 10 s. 
• FEN: 2.5 -m chain link mesh fence with outriggers.  
• Camera and Microwave Sensor down each fence-line. 
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• PD for crawling through microwave sensor is (M-H) 0.5-0.7 for one person. For 2 
intruders the non-detection probability of the microwave sensors,  
βD = (0.5)(0.5) = 0.25 → PD = 0.75. 
• Additionally, there might be a 5% chance of being seen by the cameras while 
climbing the fence. βD = (0.25)(0.95) = 0.2375 → PD = 0.7625. 
2. Task 2, from the protected area to the building: 
• Wall surface was 15 -cm thick concrete with No.4 rebar. PD ≈ 0.95.  
The adversary would use a TNT shaped charge to penetrate the concrete wall 
assuming 1 s to penetrate, also a PD = 0.5 from drawing attention within the building.  
Therefore, βD = (0.05)(0.5) = 0.025 → PD = 0.975 
• Then about 5 s to run to the building. A chance of being seen by the cameras was 
assumed to be 0.025% during this 5 s. PD= 0.025 
3. Task 3, from the building to the reactor containment: 
• DOR: This path would include running around the hallway to the 0.75 -cm steel plate 
door, and penetrating the 0.75 -cm steel plate door to enter the reactor containment. 
1. The adversary would run around the hallway to the 0.75 -cm steel plate door with 
assuming 5 s to run the hallways to the door, passive camera. PD = 0.125. 
2. The adversary would penetrate the 0.75 -cm steel plate door to enter the reactor 
containment assuming the mean delay time of 30 s to penetrate with cutting torch, 
passive camera. PD = 0.15. 
Total delay time would be 35 s to enter reactor containment with all these tasks, also 
assuming a PD = 0.5 from drawing attention within the building.  
Therefore, βD = (0.875)(0.85)(0.5) = 0.372 → PD = 0.628. 
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4. Task 4, from the reactor containment into the critical equipment room 
• DOR: 5 -cm wood pedestrian door with balance magnetic switch and electromagnetic 
lock assuming the mean delay time of 12 s to penetrate door with fire ax, and 
additional 3 s to run to the target before the 18 s to set the 10 kg explosive.  
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The value of PI for this pathway was calculated with these assumptions, PD, tD, RFT using EASI 
model Excel tool shown in Table 16, and the calculated value of PI value was 0.43. 
 
 
 
Table 17. Calculation of Probability of Interruption for Pathway 3 Using EASI Model. 
  
Estimate of 
Adversary 
Sequence 
Interruption 
Probability of Interruption: 0.43 
Probability of 
Alarm 
Communication 
System Response Time 
(in seconds) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
 0.9 90 27 
Task Description PD Location 
Delay Time 
(seconds) 
Time 
Left 
(seconds) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Penetrates the Fence  0.7625 FEN 12 3.6 198 
2 
Run to the concrete  
wall surface at the left side 
of the building 
0.05 VHD 10 3.0 186 
3 
Penetrate 15 -cm thick 
concrete wall using TNT 
shaped charge to enter into 
the building 
0.975 SUR 1 0.3 176 
4 Run to the building 0.025 SUR 5 1.5 44 
5 
Run around hallway, 
penetrate 0.75 -cm steel 
door to enter into the 
reactor containment area 
0.647 DOR 35 10.5 39 
6 
Run to the reactor 
containment area 
 DOR 5 1.5 38 
7 
Penetrate the 5 -cm wooden 
door to enter into the 
critical equipment room  
 DOR 12 3.6 33 
8 
Enter into the critical 
equipment room 
 DOR 3 0.9 21 
9 Sabotage the reactor vessel                                               Target 18 5.4 18 
 
  
 92 
 
 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1 Summary 
The objective of this study was to perform the impact investigation on a reinforced 
concrete model due to Tri-Nitro Toluene (TNT) shaped charge using a numerical simulation 
software. In addition, a vulnerability analysis of a PPS was performed to provide the most 
vulnerable pathway for a hypothetical nuclear research reactor facility if an adversary planned to 
sabotage the nuclear research reactor facility using TNT shaped charge. ANSYS Simulation 
Software was used for the numerical simulation. Also, the probability of interruption (PI) was 
calculated with the Adversary Sequence Diagram (ASD) for the PPS vulnerability analysis.  
In this study, two different types of simulation software codes that can be coupled for the 
advanced analysis were used within ANSYS Simulation Software system. One was ANSYS 
Explicit Dynamic STR (Structure) software and the other one was ANSYS AUTODYN software. 
ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR software provides suitable solutions of nonlinear dynamic events 
for a short duration, including a drop and impact testing with low velocity or high velocity, 
deformation by high pressure, explosion, etc. ANSYS AUTODYN software also provides 
suitable solutions of nonlinear dynamic events similar to ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR, but 
this software is focused on complicated nonlinear dynamic events like high explosions and 
detailed damage responses of materials such as cracks and fragments.  
The reinforced concrete wall was modeled using ANSYS Explicit Dynamic code with 
dimensions of 1850 mm (L) x 1807 mm (H) x 300 mm (W) using 140 MPa concrete material. 
The concrete wall was reinforced with 14 mm ø steel bars using 4030 steel material. The 
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reinforced concrete wall target was located at a distance of 50 meters from a TNT shaped charge 
design.  
Using air, TNT, AL 2024-T4, copper, TNT shaped charges were modeled and simulated 
using ANSYS AUTODYN code. AL 2024-T4 was used to hold TNT as a cylindrical case, and 
copper was used for the liner material with a conical shape. The amount of TNT of a shaped 
charge was calculated by geometry of the explosive material which was a cylinder and the 
geometry of the liner material which was a cone with its density. 7.64 kg TNT shaped charge 
was used as a beginning model. 
The fragment produced due to 7.64 kg TNT shaped charge was modeled with the 
reinforced concrete wall model in ANSYS Explicit Dynamic STR code, and all data were 
transferred to ANSYS AUTODYN code in order to perform the simulation of the impact 
investigation on the reinforce concrete wall model due to TNT shaped charge. 7.64 kg TNT 
shaped charge took 27.20 ms with the incident velocity of 2039.9 m/s in order to create an 
impact on the reinforced concrete model. The fragment was able to penetrate fully, and it created 
a hole on the reinforced concrete model. The size of the hole was 86 mm at the front size and103 
mm at the back side.  
The resulted hole size was not enough for a person to pass through, therefore parametric 
studies were performed using 7.64 kg TNT shaped charge by increasing horizontal length or 
vertical length, and thickness of liners. The parametric study of the horizontal length increase 
resulted in increasing the length of the fragments and the incident velocity as the horizontal 
length of TNT shaped charge was increased, however the diameter of the fragments was same. 
From the parametric study of the vertical length increase, the diameter of the fragments were 
increased and the length of the fragments was slightly increased, however the incident velocity 
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considered a constant as the vertical length was increased. The parametric study of increasing 
thickness of liners resulted in the largest fragment size, however the incident velocity was 
decreased as the thickness of liner was increased. 
With these parametric studies, the final design of TNT was modeled and simulated with 
increased the horizontal length, the vertical length, and thickness of liners. From the parameter 
study of the horizontal length increase, the horizontal length of 400 mm was chosen. Also, the 
vertical length of 273 mm was chosen from the parametric study of the vertical length increase. 
This was because the resulted hole size in the horizontal length and the vertical length was the 
largest hole size. Only the variables for the final design was the thickness of liners which was 9.0 
mm, 13.5 mm, 18.5 mm, and 22.0 mm. The calculated amount of TNT was 143.35 kg, and the 
thickness of 22.0 mm was chosen for the final design of TNT shaped charge. This model created 
a big enough size of hole for a person to pass which was 342 mm at the front side and 364 mm at 
the back side.  
The vulnerability analysis was performed assuming that the adversary will use TNT 
shaped charge in order to sabotage the hypothetical nuclear research reactor facility. There were 
three possible pathways to be considered within the hypothetical nuclear reactor facility. The 
ASD for each case was created to investigate for minimizing task times and probability of 
detection for the adversary, and then the probability of interruption was calculated using EASI 
model Excel. The calculated values for each pathway were 0.70, 0.76, and 0.43. From the results, 
the most vulnerable pathway to the hypothetical nuclear research reactor would be with the 
calculated value of the probability was at 0.43 if an adversary tried to sabotage the nuclear 
facility using TNT based shaped charge, which shows a substantial vulnerability of the PPS.  
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4.2 Conclusions 
In conclusion, a hypothetical nuclear research reactor facility was used to perform a 
vulnerability assessment within this study if an adversary used TNT shaped charge in order to 
sabotage the nuclear reactor facility. TNT shaped charge could be used to penetrate the 
reinforced concrete wall for minimizing tasks in order to approach to the desired target within 
the research reactor building even if the probability of detection would be high. Also, the 
vulnerability assessment could provide the most vulnerable paths within the research reactor 
building. These vulnerability assessments of the PPS was made possible through the parametric 
studies using ANSYS AUTODYN code of impact on the concrete if the adversary used TNT 
based shaped charge. Therefore, it would be important to strengthen nuclear security and predict 
the blast load or its impact correctly on the structures that can be used in a nuclear facility. This 
was because terrorists could weaken a nuclear facility’s PPS using direct explosions, other 
explosive devices, bullets, or linear shaped charges. As a result of these, breaking into the facility 
could occur and the related harmful effects including the release of high levels of radioactivity. 
In addition, it could be an avenue for adversaries to steal special nuclear material to make 
nuclear explosive devices after the adversaries attack or sabotage the nuclear facility. 
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